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such injury is not synonymous with the phrase "arising out of and in
the course of the employment" as used in section 3600 to describe a
compensable injury .... 20
Thus the Mclvor court distinguished "scope of his employ
ment" from "arising out of and in the course of the employment,"
declaring that the former implied a strict, more employer-oriented
sort of activity than did the latter. The First District Court of
Appeals which heard the Saala case disagreed with the Fourth
District's interpretation of a co-employee's liability. The First
District Court asserted that "There is no reason to assume ... that
the Legislature intended the area of immunization to be less than
the area of compensation.' Subsequently, the Supreme Court'sjudgment in Saala decided the issue in favor of the Fourth District's
view.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing the potential for double recovery, the California
Supreme Court nevertheless holds a negligent employee responsible
for his actions in this overlapping area in which workmen's com-
pensation is applicable but the co-employee is not immune from suit.
For an employee to be free from liability for his negligence, he must
be working strictly within the scope of his employment in the
respondeat superior sense of that phrase, while the injured em-
ployee's ability to recover workmen's compensation benefits extends
to broader situations arising from his employment, including park-
ing lot accidents following a work shift.
Kent Frewing
SURFACE WATERS IN CALIFORNIA:
ADOPTION OF REASONABLE USE RULE:
KEYES V. ROMLEY (CAL. 1965)
A landowner, whose property is higher than that of his neighbor,
has certain rights and duties concerning the surface water that
flows from his property onto the property of the other. As a corollary
to this, the owner of the lower or servient tenement has other rights
and duties concerning the flow of the water onto his land. Thus
stated, the surface water problem has been clearly identified in all
20 Id. at 139-40, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
21 Saala v. McFarland, 231 A.C.A. 22, 28, 41 Cal. Rptr. 530, 535 (1964).
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the jurisdictions of the United States.1 Nevertheless, the applicable
rule of law has varied according to each jurisdiction.2
PRIOR LAW IN CALIFORNIA
Traditionally, California has followed the civil law rule.' That
rule can be stated as follows:
. .. [A]s between the owners of higher and lower ground, the upper
proprietor has an easement to have surface water flow naturally from
his land onto the land of the lower proprietor, and that lower pro-
prietor has not the right to obstruct its flow and cast the water back
on the land above.
4
The California courts were quick, however, to apply an excep-
tion to this rule if the real property in question was located in an
urban area. By way of dictum, the California Supreme Court said
that the civil law rule was not generally followed, "in so far as it
applies to town or city lots."5
Succeeding cases in this state have re-emphasized this general
distinction. In Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles'
and Voight v. Southern Pac. Co.,' the court recognized the need for
a modification of the civil law rule in view of the changing character
of the community. The court in the Voight case distinguished the
rule set forth in LeBrun v. Richards a by stating:
We would point out, however, in that case [LeBrun] plaintiff and
defendant were both still engaged in agriculture. . . . In that case
neither plaintiff nor defendant was a party to the urbanization of the
neighborhood.8
Nevertheless, the Voight case continued to treat its ruling as an
exception to the civil law doctrine. It was for the District Court of
Appeal, in Keyes v. Romley,9 to assert that the rule in California
had changed to the reasonable use doctrine.
1 Surface waters have been defined as ". . . waters that are precipitated by
rains and snows on the land. . . .The chief characteristic is inability to maintain
their identity and existence as a body or stream of water. They flow vagrantly
over the land but are not divested of their character as surface waters by reason
of flowing onto lower land in obedience to the law of gravity ... 2" 52 Cal. Jur.
2d Waters § 724 (1959).
2 There are generally three views on surface waters. For discussion see 93
C.J.S. Waters § 114(a)(1) (1956).
3 LeBrun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825, 72 A.L.R. 336 (1930).
4 93 C.J.S., supra note 2, at 803.
5 Ogburn v. Connor, 46 Cal. 346, 13 Am. Rep. 213 (1873).
6 103 Cal. 461, 37 Pac. 375 (1894).
7 194 Cal. App. 2d 907, 15 Cal. Rptr. 59 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1961).
7a 210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825 (1930).
8 Id. at 915, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
9 233 A.C.A. 681, 43 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1965).
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THE KEYES CASE AND A NEW RULE
In the Keyes case, the plaintiffs, Keyes, and the defendants,
Lusebrinks, were adjoining landowners in the town of Walnut Creek.
In 1956, the defendants leased their property, as yet unimproved, to
the defendant Romley. The plaintiffs, in the meantime, built an
appliance shop on their premises during the same year. In the process
of building, they piled excavated dirt in the rear of their property,
which was adjacent to the boundary line of the defendants' property.
Later in 1957, the defendant lessee constructed a building which
housed an ice rink. He constructed an asphalt pavement around
the building. The defendant also installed four downspouts on the
side of the building nearest to the plaintiffs' land. Excavation and
further improvements by both parties changed the contour of the
land so that the property of the plaintiffs was lower than that of the
defendants. Water from the defendants' land flowed onto the Keyes
property. Keyes tried to divert the water away by constructing a
ditch. After that failed, he used railroad ties in an attempt to curtail
the flooding. Flooding occurred from 1959 to 1961. The problem
was finally remedied in 1962, but the plaintiffs brought this action
to recover damages which were sustained during the preceeding three
years.
The trial court found that the defendant Romley had gathered
surface waters onto the lower lands of the plaintiffs in a greater
volume than had been discharged prior to the construction of the
ice rink and the asphalt pavement. Accordingly, judgment was given
in favor of the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the District Court reversed the judgment in favor
of the defendants. In doing so, the court unequivocally asserted a
new doctrine concerning surface water rights in California.
The reasonable use rule, sometimes referred to as the Minnesota
rule, differs considerably from the civil law and common enemy °
rules. Under it, a possessor of land is not unqualifiedly privileged to
deal with surface water as he pleases, nor is he absolutely prohibited
from interfering with the natural flow of surface waters to the detri-
ment of others. Each possessor is legally privileged to make reason-
able use of his land, even though the flow of the surface waters is
altered and causes some harm to others. The owner of the dominant
10 Under the common enemy rule, surface water is " . . . regarded as a common
enemy which every proprietor may fight as he deems best, regardless of its effect
on other proprietors; and under this rule the lower proprietor may take any measures
necessary for the protection or improvement of his property, although the result
is to throw the water back on the land of an adjoining proprietor. . . ." 93
C.J.S. Waters § 114(a)(2) (1956).
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tenement incurs liability only when his harmful interference is
unreasonable."
The court concluded in Keyes that to establish reasonable use:
(1) there should be a reasonable necessity for the drainage; (2)
reasonable care must be taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the
land receiving the burden; (3) the utility or benefit accruing to the
land drained should reasonably outweigh the gravity of the harm
resulting to the land receiving the burden; (4) when practicable,
the drainage should be accomplished by improving and aiding the
normal and natural system of drainage according to its reasonable
carrying capacity, or in the absence of a natural drain, a reasonable
and feasible artificial drainage system should be provided. 2
Instead of distinguishing between urban and rural property, as
the courts in previous cases had done, this court adopted a different
tack. Reasonableness is to be the determining factor. Other jurisdic-
tions which have adopted the reasonable use rule are New Hamp-
shire,' 8 Minnesota,14 New Jersey,'5 and most recently, Alaska.'
CONCLUSION
The abandonment of the civil law rule has been long in coming.
In the main, California courts have recognized that the civil law
rule, which defined surface waters in terms of natural flow, is no
longer adequate in a growing, highly urbanized and industrial state.
In so far as the reasonable use rule has been adopted, there are
several questions which remain to be answered.
The first point of inquiry is, does the reasonable use rule
apply only to urban lands? The court in the Keyes case arrived at
its decision by observing:
In view of the rapid growth and development of urban com-
munities in this state, we believe that the time has come for the
adoption in this state of a rule with respect to surface waters in cities
and towns which attends the application of the rule of reason and
will thereby balance the competing interests in the light of social'
progress and common wellbeing.
17
11 See generally Kinyon & McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24
Mi m. L. REv. 891, 904 (1940).
12 233 A.C.A. 681, 690-91, 43 Cal. Rptr. 683, 690 (1965).
13 City of Franklin v. Durgee, 71 N.H. 186, 51 At. 911 (1902).
14 Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 163, 32 N.W. 462 (1894).
15 Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
16 Weinberg v. Northern Alaska Dev. Corp., 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1963).
Also, for general comments on reasonable use rule see 59 A.L.R.2d 435.
17 233 A.C.A. 681, 689-90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 683, 690 (1965). [Emphasis added.]
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If the court meant to apply the rule of reason only to the urban areas
of the state, the problem of surface waters in the rural parts of the
state has no applicable rule of law, unless the civil law rule is to be
applied. The language of the District Court of Appeal seems to
consider only the urban lands of California. Certainly, if the court
meant to have a bifurcated surface water doctrine, it left itself
open to further problems of determining what constitutes an urban
area. In all probability, the courts will apply the reasonable use
doctrine to rural lands as well as to urban lands in order to avoid
this dilemma.
The second question is, does the adoption of the reasonable use
rule mean that the court is tending to look at the surface water prob-
lem in terms of tort liability, rather than in terms of property law?
Traditionally, the surface water problem was an area of property
law. With the application of the rule of reason, the implication
seems to be that the legal relations of the parties are defined more in
terms of legal obligations rather than by the rigid rules found in
property law. It has been observed that:
Such words as "right," "servitude" and "easement" seem to
connote something fixed and definite to most courts, and it is difficult
for them to use those terms in describing flexible legal relations
dependent on varying circumstances. The terms have acquired a certain
rigidity and absoluteness from their long association of the Land
Law. 18
The same writers seemed to feel that the reasonable use rule
tended to define surface water in terms of tort law.'" They went on
to say that the use of tort law in this area would bring out a clearer
and more penetrating analysis of the fundamental considerations
involved.' °
The practical importance of this problem is apparent. Certainly,
the theory which one uses to plead his surface water action may well
determine the outcome of his case.
Grace M. Kubota
18 Kinyon & McClure, supra note 11, at 937-38.
19 Id. at 939.
20 Ibid.
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